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I. INTRODUCTION
[T]he Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many to
participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture that
reaches far beyond local boundaries. . . . Yet the law’s response to the
Internet, when tied to changes in the technology of the Internet itself,
has massively increased the effective regulation of creativity in
America. To build upon or critique the culture around us one must
ask, Oliver Twist-like, for permission first.1
In May 2014, a group of eight theatre students at The Evergreen
State College2 in Olympia, Washington ran into an unexpected road-
block erected by the college’s administration.3  Despite spending the
entire spring quarter writing and rehearsing an original musical under
faculty supervision, the administration pulled its support and barred
the student theatrical troupe from performing the work on campus.4
The Quisney Project Presents: O.U.T.: Once Upon a Time purported
to be a parodic “work of critical inquiry and political commentary”
that borrowed lyrics and music from popular Disney songs to criticize
the media conglomerate for its perpetuation of gender norms through
songs and movies.5
The students involved in the production received course credit for
their work, consulted with and obtained the approval of an academic
dean, and gained a legal thumbs-up from a nonprofit group of law-
yers.6  All appeared to be on track for a series of June 2014 perform-
ances when, two weeks prior to “curtains up,” the college’s provost
pressured the same dean who had approved the show to demand any
incorporation of the Walt Disney Company materials be stricken.7
The reason?  A concern voiced by the state attorney general’s office
that the production could trigger copyright liability.8
1. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW
TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 9–10 (2004).
2. A progressive public liberal arts and sciences college, Evergreen boasted an undergraduate
student enrollment of more than 4,000 for Fall 2014. Evergreen Fact Page, EVERGREEN ST. C.,
http://www.evergreen.edu/institutionalresearch/factpage.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2015).
3. Jacob H. Rooksby, Frozen: Free Speech at Evergreen State College, HIGHER EDUC. L. (June
5, 2014, 5:22 PM), http://www.highereducationlaw.org/url/2014/6/5/frozen-free-speech-at-ever-
green-state-college-1.html.
4. Letter from the Faculty, Evergreen State College, to the Administration, Evergreen State
College (last updated May 28, 2014) [hereinafter Evergreen Faculty Letter], reprinted at Brian
Rowe, Copyright v. Academic Freedom @ Evergreen State College, WASH. LAW. FOR THE ARTS
BLOG (June 5, 2014), http://thewla.org/copyright-v-academic-freedom-evergreen-state-college/.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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Of course, anyone with so much as a remedial understanding of
copyright law knows that wasn’t a realistic possibility.9  Even the col-
lege’s faculty—which, presumably, consists mostly of nonlawyers—
recognized, as it expressed in a resolution supporting the students,
that the show was transformative and thus protected by the Copyright
Act’s fair use provisions.10  No doubt, the state’s attorney knew as
much.11
So it’s extraordinarily doubtful that the college really believed that
the show could trigger copyright liability.12  Rather, its likely fear—
and one that’s not necessarily unreasonable—was that a lawsuit, re-
gardless of its merits or the college’s ultimate chances of success,
could drown the university in years of costly litigation.13  In short, the
college, and in turn, its students, became the victims of bullying14—
bullying by a much larger, much richer, and much more sophisticated
entity that has a track record of using the courts and the threat of
litigation to get its way.15
Copyright thugs—those who threaten or actually initiate litigation
against anyone making use of their work, regardless of the reason—
are not an isolated problem.16  They surface frequently, using their
government-granted monopolies to “shakedown” those who have the
temerity to transform existing works into new and creative art.17
Given the ever-increasing propensity of everyday people to avail
themselves of routine technology and digital distribution methods
such as YouTube and Facebook, conflict between copyright holders
and those seeking to make fair use of existing works will only grow.18
This Article explores one potential way to combat such bullying.
By drawing on the theories and mechanisms many state legislatures
have implemented to address a similar type of intimidation exacted
through defamation and tortious interference lawsuits,19 judges should
9. Tim Cushing, College Pulls Support for Students’ Parodic Musical Because It *Imagines*
Disney Might Sue It, TECHDIRT (June 17, 2014, 10:02 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20140613/12130627573/College-Pulls-Support-Students-Parodic-Musical-because-it-Imagines-
Disney-Might-Sue-it.shtml.
10. Evergreen Faculty Letter, supra note 4; see also infra Part II.
11. See Cushing, supra note 9.
12. See Rooksby, supra note 3.
13. See, e.g., Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 2012).
14. Cushing, supra note 9.
15. Rooksby, supra note 3; see also LESSIG, supra note 1, at 145–46 (detailing a $100 million
suit filed by Disney against a company that made “trailer” advertisements that actually pro-
moted Disney films).
16. See generally LESSIG, supra note 1, at 183–99.
17. See generally id.
18. See id. at 10.
19. See infra Part V.
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follow the lead of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which
utilized the already-existing federal motion practice scheme in 2012 to
dismiss a clearly baseless case before costly discovery commenced.20
If other courts did the same, it would impose strong disincentives for
those who bring copyright suits for no other purpose than to snuff out
fair use of their works.
Part II of this Article addresses in greater detail the problem of
“copyright thugs” through several real-world examples.  Part III dis-
cusses the defense of fair use and explores in more detail why many
uses of copyrighted work do not amount to infringement.  Part IV ex-
plores some potential answers to the problem of copyright bullying
and explains why such solutions do not go far enough.  Part V exam-
ines how many state legislatures have managed to combat an ex-
tremely similar problem, seen often in defamation law, by enacting
what are popularly known as “anti-SLAPP” statutes.  Finally, Part VI
explores how federal courts can simulate the effect of anti-SLAPP
statutes by utilizing already-existing civil procedure rules.
II. OF BULLIES AND LUNCH MONEY
This is the world of the mafia—filled with “your money or your life”
offers, governed in the end not by courts but by the threats that the
law empowers copyright holders to exercise.21
A. Thuggin’ and Muggin’: Tales of Shakedowns
The story of the “Evergreen Eight” detailed in this Article’s intro-
duction is hardly novel or new.  Bullying at the hands of copyright
thugs is a tale as old as intellectual property law itself.22  But the ad-
vance of technology has delivered the problem to the mainstream.23
As Harvard Law School Professor Lawrence Lessig has observed,
We live in a “cut and paste” culture enabled by technology.  Any-
one building a presentation knows the extraordinary freedom that
the cut and paste architecture of the Internet created—in a second
you can find just about any image you want; in another second, you
can have it planted in your presentation.24
That cut-and-paste freedom has made artistic creators out of all of us,
and as we create, we invariably build on existing works.25  The explo-
sion in use has been met with what almost seems to be a primal reac-
20. Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 689 (7th Cir. 2012).
21. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 191.
22. See id. at 130–39.
23. See id. at 145–46.
24. Id. at 105.
25. See id. at 105–06.
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tion by copyright holders to defend their “property” at all costs.26  As
Lessig goes on to note, “[W]e can all understand the wrong in com-
mercial piracy.  But the law now purports to regulate any transforma-
tion you make of creative work using a machine.”27
In one recent stunning example of irony,28 Lessig, perhaps the most
visible and high-profile critic of overly restrictive copyright polices,
found himself the unwitting victim of a copyright bullying attempt.29
In 2010, he posted a lecture—which, again, ironically, was about shar-
ing existing technology and creative works to encourage new, trans-
formative material—on the video-sharing site YouTube.30  In the
lecture, Lessig used another YouTube video that had been posted in
2009, combining the French pop/rock band Phoenix’s song
Lisztomania with video clips of characters dancing from 1980s movies
like The Breakfast Club, Pretty in Pink, Footloose, and Mannequin.31
In similar fashion to the Harvard University baseball team’s 2012 lip-
synced backseat-van dance to Carly Rae Jepson’s Call Me Maybe32
and the 2013 Harlem Shake33 video meme, the Lisztomania “brat pack
mashup” video spawned its own series of countless imitations by copy-
cats around the world.34  Among the many points Lessig was trying to
26. Id. at 18.
27. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 144.
28. And by irony, I mean real irony (defined by Merriam-Webster as “a situation that is
strange or funny because things happen in a way that seems to be the opposite of what you
expected”), and not “irony” as apparently understood by pop singer Alanis Morissette in her
1995 song Ironic. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1194 (3d ed. 1993);
ALANIS MORRISSETTE, Ironic, on JAGGED LITTLE PILL (Maverick Records 1995).  In that tune,
Morissette identifies a number of situations as “ironic” (such as dying the day after winning the
lottery, finding a fly in a glass of wine, meeting a man’s wife after discovering an attraction to the
man himself, and encountering a glut of spoons while looking for a knife) when, in actuality, they
are simply a series of either unfortunate, frustrating, or tragic events. MORRISSETTE, supra.
29. Laura Sydell, Record Label Picks Copyright Fight—with the Wrong Guy, NPR (Sept. 27,
2013, 4:01 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/09/27/226834651/Record-Label-
Picks-a-Fight-over-Copyright-with-the-Wrong-Guy.
30. Chris DeVille, Phoenix Side with Lawrence Lessig on “Lisztomania” Fair Use Lawsuit,
STEREOGUM (Feb. 28, 2014, 11:03 AM), http://www.stereogum.com/1667378/Phoenix-Side-with-
Lawrence-Lessig-on-Lisztomania-Fair-Use-Lawsuit/news/.
31. Jaimedelaguilayrei, Phoenix Lisztomania Brat Pack Mashup, YOUTUBE (July 26, 2008),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XtE-xnPKj28.
32. Brian Anthony Hernandez, This Is Crazy: Harvard Athletes Perform “Call Me Maybe”
[VIDEO], MASHABLE (May 8, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/05/08/This-is-Crazy-Harvard-
Athletes-Perform-Call-Me-Maybe-video/.
33. Kristy Muir, Copycat Shakers Tap into Worldwide Video Hit by Coast Teens, SUNSHINE
COAST DAILY (Feb. 15, 2013, 9:28 AM), http://www.sunshinecoastdaily.com.au/news/caloundra-
teens-shake-up-net-to-become-video-stars/1756874/.
34. Lisztomania Brat Pack Mashups, KNOW YOUR MEME, http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/
lisztomania-brat-pack-mashups (last visited July 5, 2014).
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make in his lecture, foremost among them was the celebration of mul-
tiple “artists” building on the creations of others.35
Liberation Music, the label that released Phoenix’s album in Aus-
tralia, issued a so-called “takedown” notice to YouTube after Libera-
tion’s automated “bot” flagged Lessig’s lecture as containing
copyrighted material.36  YouTube, as is its practice in availing itself of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s (DMCA) “safe harbor” provi-
sion,37 complied with the takedown demand and removed the video.38
Lessig then took the offensive, suing Liberation for violating the
same statute under which it demanded removal of the lecture.39  Be-
cause the DMCA creates a cause of action against “[a]ny person who
knowingly materially misrepresents . . . that material or activity is in-
fringing,”40  Lessig claimed that Liberation had violated the good faith
requirements of the statute because it either knew or should have
known that the use of the song in the lecture was fair and protected by
the Copyright Act.41
Of course, Lessig was absolutely correct, and in February of 2014,
Liberation paid him “an undisclosed sum” of money to settle the
suit.42  Along with the settlement funds, which Lessig pledged to do-
nate to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Liberation agreed to
change its practices regarding takedown notices and legal threats.43
35. Lawrence Lessig, Closing Keynote Address at the CC Asia Pacific Conference 2010 (June
4, 2010), available at Lawrence Lessig, Open, YOUTUBE (June 8, 2014), https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=KBTWoCaNKn4.
36. Id.
37. Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 grants online service providers
safe haven from secondary copyright infringement liability providing they implement a notice-
and-takedown system.  17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).  The statute requires that on receipt of a take-
down notice issued by a copyright holder, the service provider must “respond[ ] expeditiously to
remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of
infringing activity.” Id. § 512(c)(1)(C); see also id. § 512 (3)(A).  The person or entity who
posted the alleged infringing material may then submit a “counternotice” contesting the allega-
tion of infringement, which triggers a ten-to-fourteen-day period in which the copyright holder
may file suit against the poster for infringement. Id. § 512(g)(2).  If no suit is filed, the online
service provider may restore access to the material with no risk of copyright liability. Id.
§ 512(g)(4).
38. First Amended Complaint at 8, Lessig v. Liberation Music Pty Ltd, No. 1:13-CV-12028-
NMG (D. Mass. filed Sept. 19, 2013), 2013 WL 5500407.
39. Sydell, supra note 29.
40. 17 U.S.C. § 512(f).
41. First Amended Complaint, supra note 38, at 11.
42. Mike Masnick, Label Threatening Larry Lessig with Insane Infringement Claim over Fair
Use Video Caves In, Pays Up, TECHDIRT (Feb. 28, 2014, 2:07 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20140227/15302526383/Label-Threatening-Larry-Lessig-with-Insane-Infringement-Claim
-over-Fair-Use-Video-Caves-Pays-Up.shtml.
43. Id.
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But in the end, the case is really just an instance of a bully picking
on the wrong guy; while Lessig clearly won one for the good guys, the
average person has neither Lessig’s legal acumen nor his access to re-
sources that would enable a fair fight.
Take, for example, the story of documentary filmmaker John Else.
In 1990, Else was making a movie about German composer Richard
Wagner’s Ring Cycle operas.44  In a scene that focuses on backstage
workers at the San Francisco Opera, the stagehands were playing
checkers.45  While they played, a television in one corner of the room
aired an episode of The Simpsons.46  Else’s film captured the cartoon
in the background—a four-and-a-half-second image on a small TV in
the corner of the room—and he believed the “touch of cartoon helped
capture the flavor of what was special about the scene.”47
Of course, there’s no question that The Simpsons is copyrighted.48
And in order to use copyrighted material—even if it’s only playing in
the scene’s background—Else had to make a choice: Either obtain the
permission of the copyright holder (typically by paying for a license),
or rely on the fair use defense in the event that he’s sued for infringe-
ment.49  The first choice costs money but provides economic certainty;
the second is potentially free but leaves open the possibility of an in-
fringement suit down the road.50  In attempting to “clear the rights” to
use the scene, Else first called Matt Groening, the creator of The
Simpsons.51  Groening gave his blessing, but told Else to contact Gra-
cie Films, the show’s producer.52  Gracie cleared it as well, but like
Groening, directed Else up the chain to Fox Broadcasting Co., its par-
ent company.53  Fox, shockingly, demanded $10,000 in exchange for a
license to use the four-and-one-half-second background shot.54
Flabbergasted, Else sought out a Fox executive, who not only con-
firmed the $10,000 demand, but threatened to “turn [Else] over to our
attorneys” in the event he told anyone of the price.55  Else was later
told by the executive’s assistant that “[t]hey don’t give a shit.  They
44. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 95.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 95–96.
48. Id. at 96.
49. Id.
50. See LESSIG, supra note 1, at 107.
51. Id. at 96.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 96–97.
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just want the money.”56  Else did not have $10,000 to spend, so he
digitally replaced the shot with a clip from another movie.57
When asked why he did not simply elect for the second option—
rely on fair use if sued—Else responded there were several reasons.
First, his errors and omissions insurance policy application required a
detailed “visual cue sheet” identifying the source and licensing status
of each scene.58  Listing fair use instead of a license for any particular
scene would “grind the application process to a halt.”59  Second, be-
cause the clip was only four seconds, he thought he would be granted
a “free or cheap license,” and “the last thing [he] wanted was to risk
legal trouble, even nuisance legal trouble, . . . to defend a principle.”60
Third, he was told by a colleague at Stanford Law School that “Fox
would ‘depose and litigate [him] to within an inch of [his] life,’ regard-
less of the merits of [his] claim.  [The colleague] made clear that it
would boil down to who had the bigger legal department and the
deeper pockets.”61
Other examples abound.  In 2003, college student Jesse Jordan was
sued by the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) for
building a search engine to be used on his school’s intranet.62  Among
other things, the search engine’s index included music files, which
drew the attention of the RIAA.63  As Lessig puts it:
When the RIAA brought suit against Jesse Jordan, it knew that in
Jordan it had found a scapegoat, not a defendant.  The threat of
having to pay either all the money in the world in damages
($15,000,000) or almost all the money in the world to defend against
paying all the money in the world in damages ($250,000 in legal
fees) led Jordan to choose to pay all the money he had in the world
($12,000) to make the suit go away.64
Lessig notes that the same strategy led the RIAA, in 2003, to sue
261 individuals, including “a twelve-year-old girl living in public hous-
ing and a seventy-year-old man who had no idea what file sharing
was.”65  And then there was the time the Marx Brothers planned to
make a parody of the film Casablanca, and Warner Brothers En-
tertainment, Inc. threatened them with “serious legal consequences” if
56. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 97.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 98.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 48–50.
63. Id. at 49–50.
64. Id. at 200.
65. Id.
2015] CLONES, THUGS, ‘N HARMONY 831
they followed through.66  And don’t forget about when the American
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) sued the
Girl Scouts of the United States of America for failing to license the
songs they sang around campfires.67  I could go on and on . . . .
The effect of these shakedown attempts is not limited to the eco-
nomic woes of would-be copyright defendants.  Rather, it is us, the
larger populace, who suffer.  As Lessig argues, “The property right
that is copyright has become unbalanced, tilted toward an extreme.
The opportunity to create and transform becomes weakened in a
world in which creation requires permission and creativity must check
with a lawyer.”68  Indeed, perhaps the The Quisney Project Presents:
O.U.T.: Once Upon a Time was a dreadful, unwatchable piece of
drivel that would have been forgotten moments after the final curtain
fell.  Maybe it was a genius work of art, destined for Broadway or
poised to influence the next great American playwright.  Or maybe it
was a little of both.  Alas, we will never know, and that is why the
public at large is the true victim.
B. In Search of a Definition
I use the foregoing examples not to imply or argue that in every
case the copyright holder is without a legal basis to demand pay-
ment.69  Although, to be sure, there are some instances—the Else doc-
umentary, for example70—where liability clearly does not exist.
Rather, I provide them as a mere sampling of disturbing behavior I
would characterize as bullying.
Certainly, it is not my contention that the law can (either as cur-
rently equipped, or even in an ideal world) put an end to copyright
thugs.  But it is my belief that litigants and courts already have the
tools to curb one specific type of bullying—the type seen in the Ever-
green State College and John Else cases—where a clear case of copy-
right fair use turns into a “your money or your life” shakedown.
Other commentators have written on the issue of “copyright trolls,”
which clearly qualify as a type of thug.71  But the scope of this Article
is a bit different.  Trolling refers to a specific type of behavior—one
that involves either acquiring a copyright in the aftermarket or
66. Id. at 147–48.
67. Id. at 18.
68. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 173.
69. Id. at 97.
70. See supra notes 44–61 and accompanying text.
71. See generally Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and Presumptively Fair Uses, 85 U.
COLO. L. REV. 53, 57–59 (2014).
832 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:823
authoring a work for the primary purpose of suing others to extract
quick settlements.72  Undoubtedly, I don’t put Disney or Fox in that
category, as they do not create work with the primary intent of using it
to extort litigation settlement money.73
But I do think Disney and Fox can be considered a bullies—those
who have shown a propensity to demand large sums of money for
conduct that either constitutes fair use or, even if infringing, does no
harm to (and in many cases benefits) the value of their copyrights.74
It’s what Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss refers to as the “if value, then
right” theory of intellectual property: If value exists, then someone
must have a right to that value, and that value will be extracted no
matter what.75
Again, some bullies are in the right (at least legally), and this Arti-
cle makes no attempt to rein them in.  Instead, I focus on those who
threaten or initiate litigation against creators who clearly make fair
use of copyrighted work.  It is in that context I use the term copyright
“thug” or “bully” going forward.
III. THE DEFENSE OF FAIR USE
In theory, fair use means you need no permission. The theory there-
fore supports free culture and insulates against a permission culture.
But in practice, fair use functions very differently. The fuzzy lines of
the law, tied to the extraordinary liability if the lines are crossed,
means that the effective fair use for many types of creators is slight.
The law has the right aim; practice has defeated the aim.76
A. Copyright as Property
To understand the copyright defense of fair use and its application
to copyright bullies, it’s necessary to understand the purpose of copy-
right law in the first place.  And that purpose—at least as it exists in
the United States—may differ from what some might argue or believe
the purpose of copyright law should be.77
72. Id. at 59.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 1, at 96–97; Rooksby, supra note 3. But see Andrew Leonard,
How Disney Learned To Stop Worrying and Love Copyright Infringement, SALON (May 23,
2014, 4:43 PM), http://www.salon.com/2014/05/23/How_Disney_Learned_to_Stop_Worrying_and
_Love_Copyright_Infringement/ (discussing how, despite Disney being “notoriously heavy-
handed in defense of its intellectual property,” some believe Disney has shifted its strategy to
embrace online fan videos that cover copyrighted songs or appropriate its characters).
75. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 405 (1990).
76. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 99.
77. See generally 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:1 (2014).
2015] CLONES, THUGS, ‘N HARMONY 833
One common misconception is that copyright serves the same pur-
pose as other forms of property ownership. The “natural right” the-
ory, as it goes, asserts that the fruits of one’s labor and intellect are
property, and accordingly, deserve the same type of perpetual and ex-
clusive protection.78  To be sure, such a view is hardly outrageous, and
in fact, saw support even in the infant days of the United States.79  In
an 1826 letter by Noah Webster to his then-congressman cousin
Daniel, Webster argued:
I sincerely desire that, while you are a member of the House of
Representatives in Congress, your talents may be exercised in plac-
ing this species of property on the same footing as all other property
as to exclusive right and permanence of possession.
Among all modes of acquiring property or exclusive ownership,
the act or operation of creating or making seems to have the first
claim. If anything can justly give a man an exclusive right to the
occupancy and enjoyment of a thing, it must be the fact that he has
made it. The right of a farmer and mechanic to the exclusive enjoy-
ment and right of disposal of what they make or produce is never
questioned.
. . . .
I sincerely wish our legislature would come at once to the line of
right and justice on this subject, and pass a new act, the preamble to
which shall admit the principle that an author has, by common law
or natural justice, the sole and permanent right to make profit by his
own labor, and that his heirs and assigns shall enjoy the right, un-
clogged with conditions. . . .80
In response, Daniel Webster acknowledged that “[y]our opinion, in
the abstract, is certainly right and incontrovertible.  Authorship is, in
its nature, ground of property.”81  But he went on to “confess frankly,
that I see, or think I see, objections to make it perpetual.”82
Perhaps those objections were rooted in the Constitution itself, as
Article I, Section 8 grants Congress the power to “promote the pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.”83  As the Supreme Court has recognized, the pur-
pose of the Constitution’s so-called Copyright Clause “is the convic-
tion that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. DAVID MICKLETHWAIT, NOAH WEBSTER AND THE AMERICAN DICTIONARY 211–12
(2000).
81. Id. at 213.
82. Id.
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
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best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors.”84
In any event, Daniel Webster’s “objections” ultimately proved to be
the law when the Supreme Court, just eight years after Webster’s reply
to his cousin, handed down its first copyright decision in Wheaton v.
Peters.85  The Court held: “The argument, that a literary man is as
much entitled to the product of his labour as any other member of
society, cannot be controverted.  And the answer is, that he realizes
this product in the sale of his works, when first published.”86
The Supreme Court’s view of copyright as something much more
limited than natural property rights should not have been surprising to
Webster or anyone else.87  Even setting aside the Constitution’s Copy-
right Clause, Webster’s arguments mirrored earlier English debates on
the same issue,88 which were ultimately settled in favor of copyright
being positive—as opposed to natural—law.89
That the Supreme Court has been consistent in this view can hardly
be questioned; in 1918, Justice Holmes observed:
Property, a creation of law, does not arise from value, although ex-
changeable—a matter of fact. Many exchangeable values may be
destroyed intentionally without compensation. Property depends
upon exclusion by law from interference, and a person is not ex-
cluded from using any combination of words merely because some-
one has used it before, even if it took labor and genius to make it.90
And so, despite the general conception that copyright is “intellec-
tual property,” and despite the desire of some that it be treated the
same as other forms of property, “[c]opyright in the United States is
not a property right, much less a natural right.  Instead, it is a statutory
tort, created by positive law for utilitarian purposes: to promote the
progress of science.”91  That utilitarian purpose is key to understand-
ing fair use.  Without accepting that copyright’s primary purpose is to
84. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
85. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
86. Id. at 591 (emphasis added).
87. See 1 PATRY, supra note 77, § 1.1.
88. Id.
89. See Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 591 (noting that since the statute of 8 Anne, the literary property
of an author in her works can only be asserted under the statute, and not the common law).
90. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
91. 1 PATRY, supra note 77, § 1.1 (emphasis added).  To be sure, rewarding authors is not an
entirely unrecognized purpose behind copyright.  Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F.
Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).  Certainly, “copyright law celebrates the profit motive.” Id.  But it
does so only because “the incentive to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will redound to
the public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of knowledge. . . . The profit motive is the
engine that ensures the progress of science.” Id. (citation omitted).  Ultimately, the goals of
public good and rewarding authors “are not mutually exclusive; copyright law serves public ends
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serve the public interest,92 the concept of fair use does not make much
sense.
B. Fair Use and Transformation
Although codified in § 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, fair use
was originally a common-law doctrine, created by courts to protect the
public from “copyright owners bent on shutting down all unauthorized
uses or extracting license fees for conduct that should be uncompen-
sated.”93  To assume that all creation of intellectual products occurs in
a vacuum would be shortsighted; certainly, “[t]he world goes ahead
because each of us builds on the work of our predecessors. ‘A dwarf
standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant
himself.’  Progress would be stifled if the author had a complete mo-
nopoly of everything in his book.”94  Consequently, fair use exists to
maintain the delicate balance between encouraging original authors to
create and encouraging secondary authors to benefit the public by
building on that work.95  In that light, “fair abridgment,” as it was
originally known, should “not be considered a bizarre, occasionally
tolerated departure from the grand conception of the copyright mo-
nopoly.  To the contrary, it is a necessary part of the overall design.”96
Congress recognized as much, not only by codifying fair use in the
1976 Act, but also through clear statutory language in § 107’s pream-
ble: “[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by re-
production in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified
by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news report-
ing, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholar-
ship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”97
by providing individuals with an incentive to pursue private ones.”  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186, 212 n.18 (2003).
92. See Brigham Young Univ., Module 1 Copyright Basics & Requesting Information: Purpose
of Copyright Law, COPYRIGHT 101, http://copyright101.byu.edu/module1/page3.htm (last visited
July 28, 2014).
93. 4 PATRY, supra note 77, § 10:1.50.
94. Id. § 10:2 (quoting Zechariah Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM.
L. REV. 503, 511 (1945)).
95. See id.
96. Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1105, 1110 (1990).
97. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).  Section 101 of the Act specifically defines
the terms “including” and “such as” as “illustrative and not limitative.” Id. § 101; see also
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560–61 (1985).  Consequently,
even uses not listed in the preamble may be fair use. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561.
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To determine whether a particular use qualifies as “fair,” courts
must examine the copyrighted work and the allegedly infringing work
against the backdrop of four factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.98
The first factor—“the purpose and character of the use”—probes
the allegedly infringing work and tests how closely related it is to the
types of uses identified in § 107’s preamble.99  Argued by some to be
“the soul of fair use,”100 and the “heart of the fair use inquiry,”101 it
can, particularly in the case of parody, overwhelm the remaining three
factors and effectively determine the fair use question by itself.102
Perhaps the clearest example of this came in 1994, when the Su-
preme Court heard the case of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.103
There, the Court unanimously held that the popular rap group 2 Live
Crew’s use of Roy Orbison’s song Oh, Pretty Woman to create a rap
song of the same name104 was fair use, even though the rap group
profited and borrowed heavily from the original song.105
Central to the Court’s analysis in Campbell was its acceptance106 of
the defendant’s argument that his rap song Pretty Woman was a par-
98. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
99. 4 PATRY, supra note 77, § 10:5; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
578–79 (1993) (holding that a purpose and character of use inquiry “may be guided by the exam-
ples given in the preamble . . . looking to whether the use is for criticism, or comment, or news
reporting, and the like.” (citation omitted)).
100. Warren Publ’g Co. v. Spurlock, 645 F. Supp. 2d 402, 417 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
101. Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 174 (2d Cir. 2001).
102. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 597–98 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Evan Brown, Com-
ment, Shaking Out the “Shakedowns”: Pre-Discovery Dismissal of Copyright Infringement Cases
After Comparison of the Works at Issue, 9 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 69, 83 (2013) (observing
that the fair use factors are “often melded when courts examine parodies, since a parody will
only be found to have copied an impermissible amount of the copyrighted work if it is likely to
be a ‘market substitute’”).
103. 510 U.S. 569.
104. Admittedly, 2 Live Crew’s version was simply called Pretty Woman. Id. at 572.
105. Id. at 594.
106. Justice Kennedy penned a concurring opinion in which he indicated his hesitance to
agree that the rap version was indeed parody:
The Court decides it is “fair to say that 2 Live Crew’s song reasonably could be
perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing it, to some degree.” While I am
not so assured that 2 Live Crew’s song is a legitimate parody, the Court’s treatment of
the remaining factors leaves room for the District Court to determine on remand that
the song is not a fair use.
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ody of the original Orbison song—that through “comical lyrics,” his
intent was to “satirize the original work.”107  The district court had
agreed, opining that the rap song “quickly degenerates into a play on
words, substituting predictable lyrics with shocking ones” to show
“how bland and banal the Orbison song seems.”108  The district court
also agreed with the defendant that aside from its lyrics, the rap ver-
sion employed several musical devices—such as a “heavily distorted
‘scraper,’” off-key singing, and an “annoying” repeat of the original
version’s bass riff—that “exaggerate the original and help to create a
comic effect.”109  Because the parody rap version was deemed to be
“transformative,” it also satisfied the first fair use factor.110
The idea of “transformative use” can trace its origins back to En-
glish common law.111  As early as 1740, in one of the first fair use
cases, one court noted that “[infringement] must not be carried so far
as to restrain persons from making a real and fair abridgment, for
abridgments may with great propriety be called a new book, because
. . . the invention, learning, and judgment of the [secondary] author is
shewn in them.”112  This type of reasoning eventually grew into the
concept of “productive use”—the idea that use of an author’s work by
a second author or critic to create a new work would not constitute
infringement.113  Justice Blackmun discussed the term at length in his
dissent in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.114:
“[The enumerated examples in § 107’s preamble] . . .  reflect[ ] a com-
mon theme: each is a productive use, resulting in some added benefit
Id. at 599–600 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted).  Arguably, Justice Kennedy’s larger
concern was that a defendant could easily defeat a copyright infringement claim merely by say-
ing the magic words: it’s a parody. Id. at 599. He warned:
More than arguable parodic content should be required to deem a would-be parody a
fair use. Fair use is an affirmative defense, so doubts about whether a given use is fair
should not be resolved in favor of the self-proclaimed parodist. We should not make it
easy for musicians to exploit existing works and then later claim that their rendition
was a valuable commentary on the original.  Almost any revamped modern version of a
familiar composition can be construed as a “comment on the naivete´ of the original,”
because of the difference in style and because it will be amusing to hear how the old
tune sounds in the new genre.
Id. (citation omitted).
107. Id. at 572 (majority opinion).
108. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1155 (M.D. Tenn. 1991), rev’d,
972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), rev’d, 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
109. Id.
110. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583, 594.
111. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); see also 4
PATRY, supra note 77, § 10:21.
112. Gyles v. Wilcox, (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch.) 490; 2 Atk. 141, 143.
113. E.g., Geophysical Union, 802 F. Supp. at 11.
114. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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to the public beyond that produced by the first author’s work.  The
fair use doctrine, in other words, permits works to be used for ‘socially
laudable purposes.’”115
Labeling this type of use as “productive,” however, was not without
problems. According to Judge Pierre Leval,
[use of the term “productive”] risked the misconception that it en-
compassed any copying for a socially useful purpose. In fact, . . .
what the early authorities had meant was a secondary use that was
productive in that it produced a new purpose or result, different
from the original—in other words, a secondary use that trans-
formed, rather than superseded, the original.116
So, the term “transformative” was born out of Judge Leval’s writ-
ings,117 and ultimately employed by the Supreme Court in Camp-
bell.118  But regardless of what it is called—productive or
transformative—the meaning is the same: If a work “adds value to the
original—if the quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in
the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and un-
derstandings—this is the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine
intends to protect for the enrichment of society.”119
Certainly, transformative uses can take various forms, so long as
they make use of the original work for a reason that differs from the
original’s purpose.  Specifically, transformation can consist of (1) a
nonwholesale alteration of the original work’s content (for example, 2
Live Crew’s covering of—and changes to—Oh, Pretty Woman to com-
ment on the banality of the original);120 (2) no alteration of the origi-
nal work’s content, but use for a different, societally beneficial
purpose (for instance, copying a picture intended to be used in a mod-
eling portfolio, and instead using it in a news story);121 or (3) no alter-
115. Id. at 478–79 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
116. Geophysical Union, 802 F. Supp. at 11.
117. Judge Leval first set forth his idea of “transformative” use in his 1990 Harvard Law
Review article Toward a Fair Use Standard. Leval, supra note 96, at 1111.
118. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).  At least one court has
rejected the “transformative” label.  In Ty, Inc. v. Publications International Ltd., the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals used the terms “complementary” and “substitutional copying” in place
of  “transformative” and “superseding,” which it deemed to be “confusing.”  292 F.3d 512, 518
(7th Cir. 2002).  Patry has noted that “the ‘complementary versus substitutional’ formulation
provides valuable insights in some situations (like book reviews), but not others.”  4 PATRY,
supra note 77, § 10.21.  He identifies parody and satires, unauthorized derivative works, and
criticisms of one’s personal character (like the facts the Second Circuit encountered in New Era
Publications International, ApS, v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989)), as such cases
where the Seventh Circuit’s test may not be well suited.  4 PATRY, supra note 77, § 10.21.
119. Leval, supra note 96, at 1111.
120. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 594.
121. Nu´n˜ez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000).
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ation of the original’s content, but presentation of the original in a
new context or with new insights (such as using a movie clip to criti-
cize or complement a director’s style or cinematic devices).122  The
common thread between all three admittedly similar, yet nevertheless
different examples, is that none seek to serve as a market replacement
for the original work, and all three serve some purpose that arguably
inures to the public’s benefit.123  On the other hand, if an allegedly
infringing work does little more than present the original in an unal-
tered state, without adding anything new and offering no purpose dif-
ferent from that of the original, then it cannot be transformative.124
Two final points need to be made regarding transformative use and
the initial fair use factor: First, although the plain language of the
Copyright Act specifically ties the “purpose and character of the use”
to “whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes,” the mere fact that use is made for commercial
gain does not preclude a fair use determination.125  As the Supreme
Court observed in Campbell: “If, indeed, commerciality carried pre-
sumptive force against a finding of fairness, the presumption would
swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the preamble para-
graph of § 107, including news reporting, comment, criticism, teach-
ing, scholarship, and research, since these activities ‘are generally
conducted for profit in this country.’”126
The second final point with respect to the first fair use factor is an
expansion of something I briefly touched on earlier: that with respect
to parody (and even some other transformative uses), once a use is
affirmatively so categorized, the rest of the fair use analysis tends to
be short-circuited.127  As Justice Kennedy observed in his Campbell
concurrence, “[W]e have gone most of the way towards satisfying the
four-factor fair use test” simply by labeling a work as parody.128  This
is because the three other factors—particularly in the parody con-
text—tend to be overwhelmed by the first.129
Take the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work: Al-
though use of expressive, publicly available works, such as songs or
122. See Elaine Dutka, Legendary Film Clips: No Free Samples?, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2006, at
A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/28/movies/28dutk.html?_r=0.
123. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344–45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
124. Id.
125. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583–85.
126. Id. at 584 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 592
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
127. Id. at 597–98 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
128. Id.
129. See id. at 586–93 (majority opinion).
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TV shows, are less likely to be fair, parody necessarily has to make use
of such works; not only is it nearly impossible to make fun of purely
factual materials (say, an automobile user manual), but making fun of
works nobody has ever seen hardly benefits the public discourse.130
The third factor, the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the whole, is similarly swallowed by the nature of par-
ody: “In determining whether an alleged parody has taken too much,
the target of the parody is what gives content to the inquiry.  Some
parodies, by their nature, require substantial copying.”131
The fourth factor, the effect of the use on the market for the origi-
nal, is admittedly a bit more nuanced, because it is possible (if not
probable?) for a particularly biting instance of parody “to suppress
demand for the original by its critical effect.”132  But that is not the
type of adverse market effect Congress was concerned with.133  “What
it may not do is usurp demand by its substitutive effect,”134 and that
rarely occurs, because parody almost never acts as a market substitute
for its target.135  Anyone pining to own a copy of Robin Thicke’s 2013
hit Blurred Lines will certainly not be satisfied with a copy of Weird
Al Yankovic’s parody version, Word Crimes.136 To be sure, someone
may be interested in owning both.  But it’s hard to envision a con-
sumer who wants the former satisfying that desire by purchasing a
potentially cheaper substitute in the form of the latter.137
When I defined the type of creator this Article will hopefully help in
Part II.B, it was with these four factors in mind. When one makes use
of a copyrighted work in such a way as to (1) create something new
that does not merely supersede the original; (2) use no more of the
original than is necessary (which, in some cases, may be the entire
work); or (3) have no substitutive effect on the original’s market, then
those creators should not feel compelled to give in to shakedown at-
130. See id. at 586.
131. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 598 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
132. Id.
133. See id. at 592–93 (majority opinion). “[P]arody may quite legitimately aim at garroting
the original, destroying it commercially as well as artistically.” BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHUR-
RIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 69 (Columbia Univ. Press 2d prtg. 1968) (1966).
134. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 598 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
135. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 974 (10th Cir.
1996).  In his Campbell concurrence, Justice Kennedy admits that it may not always be easy “to
determine whether harm to the market results from a critical or substitutive effect.”  Campbell,
510 U.S. at 598 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
136. See Hadley Freeman, Weird Al Yankovic: “I Think Robin Thicke Was Glad I Just
Mocked His Grammar,” GUARDIAN (July 30, 2014, 1:42 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/stage/
2014/jul/30/weird-al-yankovic-interview.
137. See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 974.
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tempts by copyright owners holding licenses for ransom.138  Rather,
creators must have—and feel—the freedom to make works that inure
to the benefit of the public at large without the chilling fear that their
efforts will land them in court.139  It’s clear that freedom doesn’t cur-
rently exist.140
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS?
You either pay a lawyer to defend your fair use rights or pay a lawyer
to track down permissions so you don’t have to rely upon fair use
rights. Either way, the creative process is a process of paying law-
yers—again a privilege, or perhaps a curse, reserved for the few.141
In a recent article detailing the problem of copyright “trolls”—
which are a subset of copyright thugs—commentator Brad Greenberg
discusses a number of solutions, many of which he believes won’t
work, and one he believes will.142  Specifically, he proposes applying a
presumption of fair use against plaintiffs who meet the definition of a
troll, in essence flipping the burden of proof and requiring the plaintiff
to prove that a defendant’s use was not fair.143  In that light, he sug-
gests focusing heavily on the market harm and purpose or character
statutory fair use factors, as well as nonstatutory common law consid-
erations, including bad faith.144
But as much as I appreciate Greenberg’s idea and acknowledge that
it could very well extinguish the scourge of copyright bullying, there
are problems with applying a presumption, some of which he acknowl-
edges.145  For one, it could have the effect of protecting undeserving
infringers—in essence, erasing liability from a work that would never
qualify as a fair use but for the fact that it is owned by a troll.146  And
second, it would certainly place a new burden on legitimate copyright
owners, who would now have to produce evidence establishing that
they are not a troll anytime a defendant asserts fair use (which, of
course, would be always).147  Greenberg brushes that second concern
aside, suggesting that “a legitimate copyright plaintiff could cheaply
and quickly overcome the presumption that he is a copyright troll.
138. See Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 2012)
(“[I]nfringement suits are often baseless shakedowns.”).
139. Greenberg, supra note 71, at 55.
140. See generally LESSIG, supra note 1.
141. Id. at 107.
142. Greenberg, supra note 71, at 114–24.
143. Id. at 114.
144. Id. at 96–114.
145. Id. at 114.
146. Id. at 116.
147. Id. at 114–15.
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The plaintiff would simply need to show the existence of a bona fide
licensing program or that he did not acquire the copyrighted work
solely for litigation purposes.”148
But that answer is far too dismissive.  For one, Greenberg seems to
admit that this burden shifting would apply to any plaintiff—not just a
troll—whenever the defendant claims fair use.149 He concedes:
The primary procedural objection to this approach is that it turns
an affirmative defense into something that, rather than being
proven by the defendant, must be rebutted by the plaintiff.  Any
time a defendant asserts fair use and alleges that the plaintiff is cop-
yright troll, the plaintiff will face the expense of rebutting this
presumption.150
But I would contend it’s much more than a presumption for the plain-
tiff to overcome.  Practically speaking, it would take the form of an
entirely new element to the cause of action.  The reason is simple:
Nearly every defendant would answer the complaint by suggesting
that its use was fair and that the plaintiff is a copyright troll.  That
would effectively force the plaintiff to prove an extra element in every
instance, namely that it has a bona fide licensing program (which it
may not, if it chooses not to license its copyright) or “did not acquire
the copyrighted work solely for litigation purposes.”151
This extra element, which Greenberg argues the courts are free to
impose without any change to the Copyright Act,152 might very well
contravene the Act itself.  Congress—not the courts—has authorized
the bringing of a suit for infringement.153  Admittedly, the traditional
elements of a copyright claim—the ownership of a valid copyright and
copying of constituent elements of the work that are original154—are
not codified.  But I question whether the Supreme Court would sign
off on the judicial addition of a new element of infringement with no
congressional action suggesting such a change.
And second, Greenberg’s definition of a “troll”—one who lacks a
bona fide licensing program or acquires or creates copyright work
solely for litigation purposes155—seems to be both over- and underin-
clusive.  It’s overinclusive because there’s nothing inherently wrong
148. Greenberg, supra note 71, at 115.
149. Id. at 114–15.
150. Id. at 114.
151. See id. at 115.
152. Id. at 128.
153. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2012).
154. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
155. See Greenberg, supra note 71, at 115.
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with “refusing to deal.”156  The owner of a copyright may very well
decline to license it to others, which is her right;157 such a refusal
doesn’t make her a troll.  And without a definition of “litigation pur-
poses,” it is possible that many plaintiffs will be swept out of court
simply because a judge deems their high licensing asking price is a
shakedown (as opposed to just poor valuation).  The definition is un-
derinclusive because it may be very easy to overcome—even a copy-
right troll whose primary purpose is to exact litigation on users of the
work may have other motives (namely, profit or increasing the value
of the copyright) that would overcome the “solely for litigation pur-
poses” aspect of the definition.158
Some of Greenberg’s other mentioned solutions to the “trolling”
problem—strengthening standing requirements to prevent an assign-
ment for litigation purposes, common law prohibitions on champerty,
relying on the First Amendment, and amending the Copyright Act to
do away with statutory damages159—either do not address the larger
issue of copyright bullying or are unrealistic.  Standing and champerty,
which focus on the identity of the plaintiff actually filing the suit, may
be discussion-worthy solutions for the trolling problem, but they’re
not applicable to the type of shakedown discussed in Part II.160  As for
the First Amendment, Greenberg correctly points out that “copyright
is not subject to any First Amendment standard of review,” and copy-
right already has “built-in First Amendment accommodations”
through the fair use defense.161  And with respect to eliminating statu-
tory damages, he notes that although there is merit to the idea, “any
reform of statutory damages likely would be unpopular in Congress.
Beyond being seen as an important tool for preserving author incen-
tives for over a century, statutory damages are favored by the content
industries, which have considerable clout in Washington.”162
Consequently, the problem of copyright bullying, if it is to be
curbed, must be addressed in some way other than those already pro-
posed above or waiting for congressional action.  My suggested solu-
tion borrows from a similar bullying crisis seen in state tort actions
alleging defamation, tortious interference, civil conspiracy, and nui-
156. See Joseph P. Bauer, Refusals To Deal with Competitors by Owners of Patents and Copy-
rights: Reflections on the Image Technical and Xerox Decisions, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1211, 1231
(2006).
157. Id.
158. See Greenberg, supra note 71, at 115 (emphasis added).
159. See id. at 118–24.
160. See id. at 118–20.
161. Id. at 121 (quoting Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012)).
162. Id. at 123.
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sance.  As a result, I now discuss how many states have addressed that
problem before explaining how federal courts can draw on these solu-
tions to deal with copyright thugs.
V. “ANTI-SLAPP” STATUTES: A “NO-TOLERANCE” APPROACH
TOWARD LITIGATION BULLYING
Americans are being sued for speaking out politically. The targets are
typically not extremists or experienced activists, but normal, middle-
class and blue-collar Americans, many on their first venture into the
world of government decision making. The cases are not isolated or
localized aberrations, but are found in every state, every government
level, every type of political action, and every public issue of conse-
quence. There is no dearth of victims: in the last two decades,
thousands of citizens have been sued into silence.163
A. The Problem of SLAPPs
Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation, or SLAPP, is a label
used to describe a particular type of lawsuit brought by plaintiffs with
the intention of “silencing [their] opponents, or at least diverting their
resources.”164  The term was first coined by Professors George Pring
and Penelope Canan in two 1989 law review articles.165
Pring observed that citizens, in exchange for doing things like circu-
lating petitions, calling consumer protection offices, reporting police
misconduct, and speaking up at school board meetings, were paying
the price of “multimillion-dollar lawsuit[s] and the expenses, lost re-
sources, and emotional stress such litigation brings.”166
That’s because unlike an ordinary plaintiff, a SLAPP plaintiff167
“expects to lose and is willing to write off litigation expenses (and
163. George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 3 (1989).
164. John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPs, 26
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 395, 396 (1993).
165. Pring, supra note 163; Penelope Canan, The SLAPP from a Sociological Perspective, 7
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 23 (1989).
166. Pring, supra note 163, at 4, 6.
167. See GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING
OUT 9–10 (1996) (adopting the terms “filer” and “target,” rather than “plaintiff” and “defen-
dant,” to label parties in SLAPP litigation for sake of clarity).  Pring and Canan noted that some
SLAPPs are brought as cross- and counterclaims, which makes using the traditional “plaintiff”
and “defendant” labels potentially confusing. Id.  Although I agree that such confusion is a
possibility, I believe the “filer” and “target” dichotomy brings along its own set of problems,
given the “SLAPP target” will often become a “filer” of a motion to dismiss.  At least one other
commentator has used the terms “SLAPPer” and “SLAPPee” to respectively refer to the plain-
tiff and defendant, Kathryn W. Tate, California’s Anti-SLAPP Legislation: A Summary of and
Commentary on Its Operation and Scope, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801, 803–04 (2000), but I find
those terms equally unhelpful.  Because the California anti-SLAPP statute (which will be dis-
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even the defendant’s attorney’s fees where necessary) as the cost of
doing business.”168  Otherwise stated, the point is not to win, but
rather use the litigation process itself to intimidate, exact revenge, or
both—all with the eventual effect of silencing the target.169  These
suits are often hard to recognize because they’re camouflaged as ordi-
nary tort actions.170  A plaintiff can couch them in any number of la-
bels: defamation, tortious interference (both with contract and
prospective relations), conspiracy, nuisance, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress.171
Regardless of the form, they achieve their intended effect because
the plaintiff is usually better equipped to handle litigation than the
defendant, possessing more money and more knowledge about the le-
gal process.172  Conversely, the defendant may lack the resources
needed to mount a sophisticated defense.173  Even if the plaintiff has
zero chance of eventually “winning” on the merits of her claim, she
nevertheless “succeeds” if her suit, which the defendant cannot afford
to defend,174 has the effect of silencing the defendant’s speech.175  Al-
though nearly all states make it possible to fight back with requests for
sanctions or counterclaims for malicious prosecution—so-called
“SLAPP-back” suits—such remedies aren’t likely to be of help to a
SLAPP defendant.176  Again, the reason SLAPP suits177 work (if
you’re the plaintiff) is because the defendant is playing from a posi-
tion of weakness.178  If a defendant had access to the types of re-
cussed later at length) utilizes the terms plaintiff and defendant, I too will stick with that tradi-
tional nomenclature. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2014).
168. Lauren McBrayer, The DirecTV Cases: Applying Anti-SLAPP Laws to Copyright Protec-
tion Cease-and-Desist Letters, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 603, 609 (2005) (quoting Tate, supra note
167, at 805).
169. Dwight H. Merriam & Jeffrey A. Benson, Identifying and Beating a Strategic Lawsuit
Against Public Participation, 3 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 17, 17 (1993).
170. Pring, supra note 163, at 8–9.
171. Barker, supra note 164, at 402–03.
172. McBrayer, supra note 168, at 609.
173. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 167, at 11.
174. In her 1989 article, Canan reported that the average SLAPP suit sought $9 million in
damages and lasted an average of thirty-six months in the court system.  Canan, supra note 165,
at 26.
175. McBrayer, supra note 168, at 609.
176. See Barker, supra note 164, at 431–32.
177. The term “SLAPP suit” is “admittedly redundant, yet it has become an established part
of the vernacular.”  Merriam & Benson, supra note 169, at 17 n.1.
178. See Noah P. Peeters, Note, Don’t Raise That Hand: Why, Under Georgia’s Anti-SLAPP
Statute, Whistleblowers Should Find Protection from Reprisals for Reporting Employer Miscon-
duct, 38 GA. L. REV. 769, 781–82 (2004).
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sources needed to mount sanctions and abuse-of-process attacks, she
wouldn’t be intimidated by the SLAPP in the first place.179
The problem with SLAPPs from a larger public policy perspective is
the chilling effect intimidation lawsuits may have on citizen free
speech and efforts to petition the government for a redress of griev-
ances—undoubtedly core First Amendment rights.180  “SLAPPs dis-
suade not only named defendants, but also their neighbors and their
community.”181  Over time, as ordinary people learn about fellow citi-
zens being dragged through the courts, they will—consciously or sub-
consciously—check their own speech on controversial matters, and in
turn, the overall level of public discourse will suffer.182
The story of the Evergreen Eight illustrates this principal per-
fectly.183  Setting aside the fact that their speech (the parodic musical
using Disney tunes) may not be the same kind usually seen in SLAPP
suits, the effect of Disney’s (and similar companies’) history of litig-
iousness is clear: Evergreen’s administration self-censored out of fear
that Disney would sue.184  And that fear was not even premised on
any communication or threat from Disney; it was entirely self-con-
ceived, no doubt based on well-publicized stories of past salvos fired
by Disney at other alleged infringers.185
In that light, the tactics of SLAPP plaintiffs bear eerie similarities to
copyright bullies.  The question, then, is whether a solution aimed at
the former could be borrowed and used for the latter.
B. The Rise of the Anti-SLAPP Statute
State legislatures, convinced that a chilling effect on citizen partici-
pation is a realistic problem worthy of legislative action, began jump-
ing into the fray twenty-five years ago.186  In 1989, Washington
became the first state to pass what is known as an “anti-SLAPP”
law.187  Since then, twenty-seven other states (as well as the District of
179. See id. at 782.
180. See Tate, supra note 167, at 803–04.
181. Barker, supra note 164, at 404.
182. Joseph J. Brecher, The Public Interest and Intimidation Suits: A New Approach, 28
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105, 113–14 (1988).
183. See supra Part I.
184. Evergreen Faculty Letter, supra note 4.
185. See id.
186. See generally Jerome I. Braun, Increasing SLAPP Protection: Unburdening the Right of
Petition in California, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 984–1000 (1999).
187. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.24.500–4.25.520 (2014).
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Columbia and Guam) have enacted some form of legislation to com-
bat SLAPP suits.188
Naturally, each of the thirty statutory enactions differ in some de-
gree from the rest.189  But generally, the typical anti-SLAPP statute
seeks to lay down procedural hurdles that make it harder for a plain-
tiff to maintain her suit.190  They do so by establishing specific
processes to allow for a motion to dismiss at an early stage in the
litigation, the expedited hearing of such a motion and limitation of
discovery until after disposition, and cost-shifting mechanisms to
award attorney’s fees and court costs to a defendant who can success-
fully show that the plaintiff’s suit was a SLAPP.191
Take, for example, California’s anti-SLAPP statute.  Passed in 1993,
the California law has become the model for other states.192  It oper-
ates by creating a special motion to strike that a defendant can file
whenever she believes she’s been sued under a cause of action “arising
from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of
petition or free speech . . . in connection with a public issue.”193
Two of the keys to the operation of the law are its timelines for
rapid resolution and stay of discovery—each of these features disarms
SLAPP plaintiffs of their most potent weapon, that is, the ability to
exact financial revenge on defendants by drawing out litigation in the
name of “collection of evidence.”194  The statute grants the defendant
sixty days from the service of the complaint to file a motion to dismiss,
although the court has discretion to allow its filing at any time “upon
terms it deems proper.”195  The motion must be heard thirty days after
it is served, unless the court’s docket cannot accommodate such a
hearing in that time period.196  So, in this way, one who claims to be
the target of a SLAPP suit has a mechanism to obtain early dismissal.
Without the motion, a defendant’s only remedy would be a motion for
188. State Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, http://www.anti-slapp.org/your-
states-free-speech-protection/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2015) (identifying the scope of anti-SLAPP
laws in Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Guam,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Washington).
189. See id.
190. McBrayer, supra note 168, at 610.
191. Peeters, supra note 178, at 782.
192. Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2014), with, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 27 (West 2014).
193. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1).
194. Barker, supra note 164, at 408.
195. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(f).
196. Id.
848 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:823
summary judgment, which, at least in California, could not be filed
until sixty days after the plaintiff’s first appearance, and could not be
heard for at least another seventy-five days after the motion’s filing.197
And if a defendant were attempting to proceed under a Celotex-style
“no-evidence” motion for summary judgment—in effect, arguing that
the plaintiff has no evidence to support her claims—she would have to
wait for an “adequate time for discovery”198 to elapse before filing.
While the filing of the motion immediately stays all discovery in the
case until the motion is ruled on, the court, on a separate motion for
good cause, may allow for specified discovery.199  This provision was
the legislature’s effort at balancing the goal of giving defendants a
chance to achieve speedy resolution with the due process rights of
plaintiffs to build their cases through discovery.200  Indeed, “[b]ecause
the motion is heard within 30 days of the notice of the motion, the
plaintiff’s case may not be developed.  However, the provision al-
lowing discovery for good cause provides [the] plaintiff a means to
avoid any legitimate prejudice due to the alacrity of the
proceedings.”201
Once the motion is filed and the movant has established that the
suit falls within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute, the burden then
effectively “shifts” to the plaintiff to show “that there is a probability
that [she] will prevail on the claim.”202  Although the California legis-
lature gave no guidance as to what it meant by “probability,” most
courts have accepted203 the analysis of Wilcox v. Superior Court,204
which held the term meant only that the
plaintiff must demonstrate the complaint is legally sufficient and
supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a
favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is
credited.  If either of these requirements is not met, the motion to
strike must be granted; if both are satisfied, it must be denied.205
197. Id. § 437c(a).  No such time restraint exists at the federal level. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(b).
198. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
199. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(g).
200. Tate, supra note 167, at 841 (citing Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Wollersheim, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 620, 631 n.3 (Ct. App. 1996)); see also Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g
Co., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 54 (Ct. App. 1995) (noting that a discovery stay “literally applied in all
cases might well adversely implicate a plaintiff’s due process rights,” especially in a libel case
brought by a private plaintiff against a large media defendant).
201. Wollersheim, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631 n.3.
202. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1).
203. Tate, supra note 167, at 838 & n.199.
204. 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446 (Ct. App. 1994).
205. Id. at 454.
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The court in Wilcox likened the standard to that of a motion for
nonsuit or directed verdict, even while noting that there are some sig-
nificant differences, most notably that that the language of the anti-
SLAPP law requires only a showing of “probability” of success, while
other statutes providing dismissal mechanisms require the plaintiff to
show “a reasonable probability” or “a substantial probability” of pre-
vailing.206  Still, it refused to impose any standard lower than reasona-
ble probability, opining that “[s]urely [the legislature] did not mean
the court should accept an ‘unreasonable’ probability.”207
Assuming the plaintiff presents competent, admissible evidence es-
tablishing a reasonable probability of success at trial, the court must
then turn to the constitutional defenses raised by the defendant’s mo-
tion and affidavits.208  After considering those defenses, the court then
determines whether the plaintiff established a probability that she will
ultimately prevail on her claims.209
If the court denies the motion to dismiss, the freeze on discovery is
lifted, and the case proceeds in routine fashion.210  Notably, the stat-
ute specifically warns that a finding of probability of success is inad-
missible “at any later stage of the case, or in any subsequent action,
and no burden of proof or degree of proof otherwise applicable shall
be affected by that determination.”211  On the other hand, if the court
grants the motion to dismiss, not only is that the end of the case, but
the plaintiff is charged with paying the defendant’s attorney’s fees and
costs.212
The mandatory award of the defendant’s attorney’s fees is hardly an
insubstantial deterrent component of the statute.  Although most fee
awards range from $15,000 to $40,000,213 one case decided by the
Southern District of California in 2002 awarded more than $315,000 in
fees and costs.214
206. Id. at 455.
207. Id.
208. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(2) (West 2014); see also Wilcox, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 455 (part of the plaintiff’s burden of proving a prima facie case means “showing the defen-
dant’s purported constitutional defenses are not applicable to the case as a matter of law or by a
prima facie showing of facts which, if accepted by the trier of fact, would negate such defenses”).
209. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1).
210. See Jonathan Segal, Anti-SLAPP Law Make Benefit for Glorious Entertainment Industry
of America: Borat, Reality Bites, and the Construction of an Anti-SLAPP Fence Around the First
Amendment, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 639, 642–43 (2009).
211. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(3).
212. Id. § 425.16(c).  The statute also provides that if the court finds the defendant filed the
motion frivolously or solely with the intent of causing unnecessary delay, then the plaintiff recov-
ers its attorney’s fees and costs incurred in responding to the motion. Id.; see also id. § 128.5.
213. Tate, supra note 167, at 845.
214. Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1228 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
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As one would expect, an order dismissing a case under the Califor-
nia anti-SLAPP statute would be appealable.215  But two potential
outcomes of a motion to dismiss are worth special mention: First, what
if only part of a plaintiff’s case is subject to the motion to strike, and
thus, a dismissal is interlocutory?  For example, a plaintiff could assert
numerous causes of action, with only one coming under the anti-
SLAPP law.216  And second, what if the motion to dismiss is denied?
Because such an order would be interlocutory, should the case pro-
ceed, or should the defendant be able to appeal?  The statute itself
answers both questions.217  Section 425.16(j) specifically states that
“[a]n order granting or denying a special motion to strike shall be ap-
pealable.”218  For good measure, it cross-references California Civil
Procedure Code § 904.1, which is the general “Appealable judgments
and orders” title of the Code.219  Section 904.1(a)(13) of that statute
also lists orders granting or denying motions to strike under the anti-
SLAPP statute as being appealable.220
C. The Problem with Applying Anti-SLAPP Statutes
to Copyright Cases
Having discussed in detail the operation and effect of an anti-
SLAPP law (with California’s being only a representative example),
the next question might be, “Is there any way to apply such a state
statute to a copyright suit in federal court?”  Before discussing the
answer (which, in case you’re wondering, is “no”), it’s worth saying
that the question is not, at least from a wishful-thinking standpoint,
entirely ludicrous.  For one, many federal courts sitting in diversity
actions have applied state anti-SLAPP statutes under the Erie doc-
trine.221  Although it’s true that such laws are procedural in the way
215. Tate, supra note 167, at 848.
216. See Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 49 (Ct. App.
1995).
217. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(j).
218. Id. (emphasis added).
219. Id. §§ 425.16(j), 904.1.
220. Id. §§ 425.16(j), 904.1(13).
221. In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, the Supreme Court held that “[e]xcept in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is
the law of the State.”  304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).  In addition to giving millions of first-year law
students fits, this became known as the Erie doctrine, which stands for the proposition that “fed-
eral courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.”  Gasperini
v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996).
E.g., Brown v. Wimberly, 477 F. App’x 214, 216 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (applying Louisi-
ana’s anti-SLAPP statute pursuant to the Erie doctrine); Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 85–91
(1st Cir. 2010); United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963,
972–73 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that California’s anti-SLAPP statute was crafted to serve an
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they impose specific time constraints, stay discovery, and require an
expedited decisions, courts have recognized that these “procedural
features are designed to prevent substantive consequences—the im-
pairment of First Amendment rights and the time and expense of de-
fending against litigation that has no demonstrable merit under state
law regarding defamation.”222
Still, the application of state anti-SLAPP statutes in federal court is
not without problems or controversy.  For starters, some federal
courts in California (including, possibly, the Ninth Circuit) have held
that the key component of the special motion to dismiss—that being
the freeze on costly discovery—directly conflicts with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56, and therefore should be ignored.223  Specifically,
in Rogers v. Home Shopping Network, Inc.,224 the Central District of
California held:
[Section] 425.16 and Rule 56(f) have different objectives. Section
425.16 was designed to allow a party defending a SLAPP action to
resolve the matter as early as possible, before extensive discovery is
permitted. Rule 56(f), however, was designed to ensure that a non-
moving party will not be forced to defend a summary judgment mo-
tion without having an opportunity to marshal supporting evidence.
These divergent goals can produce directly conflicting outcomes.225
For instance, the court noted that California courts have denied dis-
covery under the statute because the defendant failed to identify what
additional facts she expected to unearth, while federal courts have al-
lowed parties “with no clear idea of what specific facts they hope to
obtain” to postpone a summary judgment ruling while they conduct
more discovery.226  The court concluded that the “discovery-limiting
aspects” of the anti-SLAPP law are in direct conflict with the “discov-
ery-allowing aspects” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and,
therefore, can’t be enforced in federal court.227
The Ninth Circuit has quite likely agreed.  In a 2001 case, the court
approvingly referenced Rogers, noting that the United States Supreme
Court has held that discovery is required—as opposed to merely per-
interest, namely the protection of the rights of free speech and redress of grievances, not directly
addressed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
222. Williams v. Cordillera Commc’ns, Inc., No. 2:13–CV–124, 2014 WL 2611746, at *1 (S.D.
Tex. June 11, 2014).
223. See Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 845–47 (9th Cir. 2001).
224. 57 F. Supp. 2d 973 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
225. Id. at 981–82.
226. Id. at 982 (quoting Sipple v. Found. for Nat’l Progress, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 690 (Ct. App.
1999) and 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2711 (3d
ed. 1998)).
227. Rogers, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 982.
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mitted—“where the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to
discover information that is essential to its opposition.”228  Still, it’s
not entirely clear whether the Ninth Circuit held the discovery freeze
to be per se invalid in any federal case; it did not remand to the district
court with instructions to allow full discovery, but rather limited its
order to allow the plaintiff to discover only information about the de-
fendant’s consulting experts.229  Indeed, at least one lower court con-
strued the Ninth Circuit’s holding to be limited, opining that it did not
say there was a conflict between the anti-SLAPP statute’s discovery
limitations and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.230
But even setting aside the question of whether the discovery-freez-
ing aspects of state anti-SLAPP laws could live peacefully alongside
Rule 56, their application in the first place has come under fire from
an appellate heavyweight.  Recently, the Ninth Circuit’s Chief Judge
Kozinski penned a scathing concurrence in which he urged an en banc
court to take a “fresh look at the question” of whether federal courts
should entertain anti-SLAPP motions to dismiss.231  He wrote that
“[t]he California anti-SLAPP statute cuts an ugly gash through th[e]
orderly process” of prediscovery motions, discovery, summary adjudi-
cation, and trial.232  He characterized the effect of the statute as “quite
a bit of disruption,” noting that he “find[s] it passing strange that state
legislatures have now displaced Congress as the delimiters of our ju-
risdiction.”233  He concluded by calling the First and Fifth Circuits
“foolish” for adopting his own court’s holding in United States ex rel.
Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.,234 arguing that “[f]ederal
courts have no business applying exotic state procedural rules which,
of necessity, disrupt the comprehensive scheme embodied in the Fed-
eral Rules, our jurisdictional statutes[,] and Supreme Court interpre-
tations thereof.”235
In any event, regardless of whether future federal courts will heed
Judge Kozinksi’s call to “back out of the wilderness” of state anti-
SLAPP statutes,236 this much is clear: No court has ever applied such a
law to a federal cause of action, and in fact, courts have uniformly
228. Metabolife, 264 F.3d at 846 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250
n.5 (1986)).
229. Id. at 846–47.
230. New.Net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1101 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
231. Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 275 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J.,
concurring).
232. Id. at 274.
233. Id. at 275.
234. 190 F.3d 963, 973 (9th Cir. 1999).
235. Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 275.
236. Id.
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held that anti-SLAPP laws only apply to state law claims.237  Because
copyright claims are exclusively federal, they would never be subject
to a special motion to dismiss procedure crafted by a state legisla-
ture.238  Nor should they be; because Congress is the body that has
drafted the Copyright Act and has authorized causes of action under
it,239 it is Congress, and Congress alone, that should fashion any kind
of remedy that would affect one’s ability to sue under it.
VI. BUILDING THE FRANKENSTEIN: SIMULATING AN ANTI-SLAPP
PROCEDURE TO VINDICATE FAIR USERS
[F]air use in America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to de-
fend your right to create. And as lawyers love to forget, our system
for defending rights such as fair use is astonishingly bad—in practi-
cally every context, but especially here. It costs too much, it delivers
too slowly, and what it delivers often has little connection to the jus-
tice underlying the claim.240
I suppose it’s possible that Congress, if it were as concerned as me
(and others) about the problem of copyright bullying, could enact an
anti-SLAPP-like solution.  I suppose it would take the form of a spe-
cial motion to dismiss enumerated in Chapter 5, or perhaps an exten-
sion of the fair use provisions in § 107 of the Copyright Act, and
would provide for anti-SLAPP-type protections such as an early-filing
deadline, freeze on discovery, speedy resolution deadline, mandatory
award of attorney’s fees, and an interlocutory appeals provision.  But
hoping for such legislative intervention is obviously unreasonable, for
reasons not worth discussing in any detail here.241
Fortunately, parties who believe they’re the victims of bullying al-
ready have a potential solution.  If the courts follow the lead of the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, it is an answer that would
be, substantively speaking, nearly indistinguishable from the effect of
an anti-SLAPP statute.  And because it’s a solution that requires no
237. See, e.g., Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A] federal court
can only entertain anti-SLAPP special motions to strike in connection with state law claims
. . . .”); Restaino v. Bah (In re Bah), 321 B.R. 41, 46 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he anti-SLAPP
statute may not be applied to matters involving federal questions . . . .”); Bulletin Displays, LLC
v. Regency Outdoor Adver., Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1180 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“Although the
anti-SLAPP statute does apply to state law claims brought in federal court, it does not apply to
federal question claims in federal court because such application would frustrate substantive
federal rights” (citations omitted)).
238. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012) (granting exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts over cop-
yright claims).
239. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b).
240. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 187.
241. See Greenberg, supra note 71, at 128 n.354 (noting congressional gridlock is greater than
ever before).
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legislative change to the Copyright Act, it’s one that could prove to be
an effective weapon in defeating baseless “shakedown” attempts by
copyright holders.
A. “What What (In the Butters???)”: The Seventh Circuit
Meets Eric Cartman
In 2008, the animated Comedy Central Show South Park aired an
episode titled “Canada on Strike,” which satirized the 2007–2008
Writers’ Guild of America strike.242  The episode’s plot has the entire
country of Canada going on strike, demanding a share of the “Internet
money” being generated by viral videos and the like.243  The show’s
main characters, Cartman, Stan, Kyle, and Butters, decide to make
their own viral meme in an attempt to generate enough “Internet
money” to pay the Canadians and settle the strike.244  Their effort re-
sults in Butters starring in a video called What What (In the Butt),
which the Seventh Circuit characterizes as “a paean to anal sex.”245
The video, as it turns out, is a parody of an actual video of the same
name by an “artist” named Samwell.246  The South Park version is,
more or less, a shot-for-shot remake of the original, except that South
Park’s is animated and sung by Butters, who is featured in several
costumes that draw attention to his nine-year-old innocence.247
Brownmark Films, which owned the copyright on the original video,
filed an infringement suit against the various entities responsible for
South Park.248  Obviously, the defendants asserted fair use in re-
sponse.249  Interestingly, they filed a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.250  The District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
granted the motion, despite acknowledging that fair use is viewed as
an affirmative defense to infringement, whereas 12(b)(6) motions to
dismiss normally test the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claim.251
242. Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 689 (7th Cir. 2012), aff’g 800
F. Supp. 2d 991 (E.D. Wis. 2011).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.; see also What What (In the Butt), WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_
What_%28In_the_Butt%29 (last modified Sept. 21, 2014, 9:51 PM).
247. Brownmark, 682 F.3d at 689.
248. Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 800 F. Supp. 2d 991, 994 (E.D. Wis. 2011).
249. Id. at 997–98.
250. Id. at 994.
251. Id. at 998, 1002.
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On appeal, the Seventh Circuit began its analysis by agreeing with
Brownmark that “courts should usually refrain from granting Rule
12(b)(6) motions on affirmative defenses.”252  The court wrote, “Rule
12(b)(6) tests whether the complaint states a claim for relief, and a
plaintiff may state a claim even though there is a defense to that claim.
The mere presence of a potential affirmative defense does not render
the claim for relief invalid.”253
But that didn’t mean the district court improperly granted the mo-
tion to dismiss.254  The Seventh Circuit noted that a court may prop-
erly dismiss a case on the basis of an affirmative defense through a
Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or Rule 56 Motion
for Summary Judgment.255  And indeed, the court affirmed on that
ground, “elect[ing] to treat [the] motion as a motion for summary
judgment.”256  The court reasoned that while the defendants should
have captioned their motion that way from the start, “the miscaption-
ing in this case should not have caused confusion, as the procedures
for both motions are essentially the same.”257
The obvious question that comes to mind is why wouldn’t the de-
fendants have captioned their motion as a 12(c) or summary judgment
motion from the outset?  The answer, it seems, is precisely the same as
the concern voiced by Evergreen State College:
It appears [the defendants’] reason for [filing the motion as a
12(b)(6)], rather than simply captioning its motion as a motion for
summary judgment, was its concern that such a maneuver would
open the door to discovery. The expense of discovery, which [de-
fendants] stressed at oral argument, looms over this suit. [Defend-
ants], and amicus, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, remind this
court that infringement suits are often baseless shakedowns.258
The Seventh Circuit brushed aside that concern, oddly writing that
“discovery would only follow a Rule 56 motion [for summary judg-
ment] if the district court granted a request for discovery.”259  I de-
scribe the statement as odd only because there’s no authority stating
that judges must specifically authorize discovery in a summary judg-
ment context.260  Of course, judges have discretion to limit discovery if
252. Brownmark, 682 F.3d at 690.
253. Id.
254. See id. at 690, 692.
255. Id. at 690.
256. Id. at 692.
257. Id.
258. Brownmark, 682 F.3d at 691.
259. Id.
260. See Gideon Mark, Federal Discovery Stays, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 405, 408–10 (2012).
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a party requests and shows good cause,261 but the Seventh Circuit
seemed to imply that the default rule would require no discovery until
one of the parties asked and received permission from the court.262
Regardless, neither party in Brownmark did ask for discovery, at
least not at the trial court level.263  The Seventh Circuit noted that
Brownmark argued the reason it didn’t ask was because “the matter
before the court was a 12(b)(6) motion, which does not allow for dis-
covery requests.”264  But the court scoffed, writing that “this is hard to
believe.  The caption on a motion does not have some independent
authority that litigants or courts must respect.”265  It noted that
Brownmark Films could have easily identified to the trial court the
kinds of evidence it would have needed to defeat a fair use defense.266
In fact, Brownmark Films did exactly that in its appellate brief, argu-
ing it should have been allowed to discover, among other things, the
defendants’ intent at the time the episode was created.267  That is not
to say that identifying such evidence would have done any good—the
court opined that any such discovery requests would have “surely en-
tail[ed] expensive e-discovery of emails or other internal communica-
tions” that the district court would have certainly denied.268
The reason any requests would have—or at least should have—
been denied, of course, is because no discovery was necessary.269  This
case, like most of the others discussed in Part II, required nothing
more than a side-by-side comparison of the two works.270  As the
court observed, “When a defendant raises a fair use defense claiming
[her] work is a parody, a court can often decide the merits of the claim
without discovery or a trial.”271  Aside from the “lampooning” of the
original video, the South Park version placed Butters “alongside other
YouTube hits including, among others, the Numa Numa Guy, the
Sneezing Panda and the Afro Ninja.”272  “This kind of parodic use has
obvious transformative value,” thereby satisfying the first fair use fac-
tor examining the purpose and character of the use.273
261. Id. at 410 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) and other authorities).
262. See Brownmark, 682 F.3d at 691.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Brownmark, 682 F.3d at 691–92.
269. See id. at 691.
270. See id. at 692.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 693.
273. Id.
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And, as is often the case with works of parody, the other three fac-
tors fell quickly in line:274 For the second factor—the nature of the
copyrighted work—the court conceded that “[t]he creative and ex-
pressive nature of the original [video] places the work within the core
of copyright protection.”275  But, it said, “this factor offers little help
to Brownmark because ‘parodies almost invariably copy publicly
known, expressive works.’”276  As for the third factor regarding the
amount used, again the court acknowledged that South Park used the
“heart” of the original.277  That’s hardly surprising, though, because
“parody, a favored use, must use a substantial amount of qualitative
and quantitative elements to create the intended allusion; there are
few alternatives.”278  Finally, as to the fourth factor regarding market
harm, the court reasoned the South Park parody’s “likely effect, ironi-
cally, would only increase ad revenue” for the original video.279  And,
of course, “[a]ny effect on the derivative market for criticism is not
protectable.”280
B. Combining Existing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with the
Copyright Act To Deter Copyright Thugs
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Brownmark is instructive in a
number of respects, and, if read appropriately, can be interpreted in
such a way as to closely simulate the effect of an anti-SLAPP statute.
First, and perhaps most importantly, the district court and Seventh
Circuit were perfectly comfortable deciding the merits of the case
without any discovery having been conducted.281  This is key to equat-
ing the dismissal to one under an anti-SLAPP law, because the evil
such statutes seek to cure is the SLAPP plaintiff’s ability to drag a
defendant into years of costly litigation.282
Certainly, not every claim of fair use—or even every claim of par-
ody within the context of fair use—will be ripe for adjudication sans
discovery.  In Brownmark, both courts were able to do a side-by-side
comparison and quickly conclude that the South Park video was pa-
274. See supra Part III.
275. Brownmark, 682 F.3d at 693.
276. Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994)).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592).
281. See Brownmark, 682 F.3d at 691; Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 800 F.
Supp. 2d 991, 999 (E.D. Wis. 2011).
282. See Barker, supra note 164, at 408.
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rodic and transformative.283  But not all comparisons are so easy.  For
example, many comparisons require a sense of each work’s context.284
Yet context may not be establishable without testimony or other evi-
dence gained through discovery.285  Likewise, because market harm is
an enumerated fair use factor, it needs to be considered alongside the
other three.286  Although such harm—or the lack thereof—is easy to
discern in parody cases, it may not be in other fair use instances, even
when the allegedly infringing work’s transformative nature is
obvious.287
All that said, even despite the fact that many claims of fair use are
not appropriately disposed of in prediscovery motions,288 many others
are.289  And courts are beginning to take note.  For example, in a 2010
case that reached the Second Circuit, the court, albeit in a “substantial
similarity” infringement context, held that in some cases, “no discov-
ery or fact-finding is typically necessary, because ‘what is required is
only a visual comparison of the works.’”290  The Second Circuit cited
to a long string of authority, including no less than six of its own cases
and four of its sister courts, to support the notion that comparison can
be performed by a court at a prediscovery stage “because the court
has before it all that is necessary in order to make such an
evaluation.”291
Likewise, a district court in Nevada granted a 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss alleging fair use against a well-known “copyright troll.”292  In
analyzing the four fair use factors without the benefit of anything
other than the pleadings and the two works themselves, the court held
the defendant’s use was fair because the copyrighted work was infor-
mational rather than creative, the defendant used only eight sentences
283. Brownmark, 682 F.3d at 692; Brownmark, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 1000.
284. Brown, supra note 102, at 88.
285. Id.
286. See L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 938 (9th Cir.), amended by 313
F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2002).
287. Brown, supra note 102, at 88–89.
288. See Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that it
was “irregular” to rule on a fair use defense on the pleadings because “no evidence had yet been
presented”); see also Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (“[T]he
issue of fair use . . . is the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright, and ought not to be
resolved in cases where it may turn out to be moot, unless the advantage is very plain.”).
289. See Brown, supra note 102, at 84–88 (discussing cases).
290. Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2010)
(quoting Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1991)).
291. Id. at 64–65.
292. Righthaven LLC v. Realty One Grp., Inc., No. 2:10–cv–1036–LRH–PAL, 2010 WL
4115413, at *3 (D. Nev. Oct. 19, 2010). See generally Greenberg, supra note 71, at 61, 65–69
(describing Righthaven and its business practices).
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of a thirty-sentence news article, and the use would not have diluted
the market for the copyrighted work.293
These decisions are in line with longstanding precedent.  For exam-
ple, in Fisher v. Dees,294 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
prediscovery grant of summary judgment on fair use grounds, noting
that “[t]he parties dispute only the ultimate conclusions to be drawn
from [the two works].  Because . . . these judgments are legal in na-
ture, we can make them without usurping the function of the jury.”295
Although there are certainly instances in which claims of fair use
cannot and should not be adjudicated at a prediscovery stage,296
courts should ask themselves whether any discovery is actually neces-
sary to rule on a motion to dismiss.  In many cases, all that is needed
are the two works, and a side-by-side comparison will reveal that the
defendant’s use was fair.297
The second key to comparing the Seventh Circuit’s Brownmark de-
cision to an anti-SLAPP dismissal is the timing of the motion to dis-
miss.  In that case, the defendant filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, which
the district court had little problem granting.298  And indeed, other
courts have done the same in the context of affirmative defenses.299
Yet, although it affirmed the holding (and actually described it as “de-
lightful”), the Seventh Circuit did take issue with the procedural pos-
ture.300  As it discussed, the problem with determining fair use on a
motion for failure to state a claim is that Rule 12(b)(6) asks whether
the complaint states a claim for relief, and it’s possible to state a claim
even though an affirmative defense may kill it.301
So, the court held, the preferable way for a defendant with a clear
fair use defense to proceed is through either a Rule 12(c) motion for
judgment on the pleadings or a Rule 56 motion for summary judg-
ment.302  I would argue the Rule 12(c) motion more closely aligns with
293. Righthaven, 2010 WL 4115413, at *2.
294. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
295. Id. at 436.
296. See, e.g., Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland Recreational Vehicles, LLC, 753 F. Supp. 2d 753,
766 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (holding that it could not determine at the pleading stage whether use was
fair because “further development of the record” was needed to rule on the first three fair use
factors).
297. See, e.g., Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2012)
(finding an “obvious case of fair use” after a side-by-side comparison).
298. Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 800 F. Supp. 2d 991, 999–1000 (E.D. Wis.
2011).
299. Id. (listing cases).
300. Brownmark, 682 F.3d at 690, 694.
301. Id. at 690.
302. Id. at 691.
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the idea of an anti-SLAPP motion and is better suited for preventing
costly discovery.  A key component of an anti-SLAPP motion to dis-
miss is its early filing; in California, it must be filed within sixty days of
the complaint’s service.303  This ensures that the motion will be heard
before the parties have an opportunity to conduct costly discovery.304
Although there’s no time limit to filing a federal Rule 12(c) motion—
the only requirements are that the pleadings be closed and that it be
filed early enough to not delay trial305—there might be a difference
between it and a motion for summary judgment when it comes to dis-
covery.  Many courts have held that summary judgment is not appro-
priate without an opportunity for discovery.306  To be sure, nothing
about the filing of a Rule 12(c) motion freezes discovery either.307
But by its own title, the Rule 12(c) motion—contrary to a motion for
summary judgment—should not concern itself with extrinsic evi-
dence.308  Rather, it should be based on the pleadings and any evi-
dence attached to the pleadings, without any reference to what may
have been turned up in discovery.309
The only aspect missing from the Brownmark cases was, admittedly,
a fairly large component of anti-SLAPP motions: the award of attor-
ney’s fees.  Although the district court granted the motion to dismiss,
and the Seventh Circuit affirmed that dismissal, neither court made
any mention of an award of attorney’s fees in the defendants’ favor.310
One could argue that without the specter of an adverse award of at-
torney’s fees, copyright bullies may not be deterred from filing suits in
the first place.
The Copyright Act, however, does provide a fee-shifting provision
that allows meritorious defendants to recover attorney’s fees.311  Spe-
cifically, § 505 of the Copyright Act gives courts discretion to award
the prevailing party its reasonable attorney’s fees as part of its costs.312
Indeed, in some of the Righthaven “troll” cases, defendants won large
303. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(f) (West 2014).
304. See Tate, supra note 167, at 811.
305. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c).  “Rule 7(a) provides that the pleadings are closed upon the filing of
a complaint and an answer . . . .”  5C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 226, § 1367.
306. See, e.g., Hammons ex rel. Vance v. United States, 90 F.3d 1145, 1148 (6th Cir. 1996)
(“The general rule is that summary judgment is improper if the non-movant is not afforded a
sufficient opportunity for discovery.”).
307. See Mark, supra note 260, at 408–10.
308. 5C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 226, § 1367.
309. Id.
310. See Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2012), aff’g 800 F.
Supp. 2d 991 (E.D. Wis. 2011).
311. See Greenberg, supra note 71, at 126.
312. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012).
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sums of money—hundreds of thousands of dollars, in fact—after ob-
taining prediscovery dismissal.313  One would imagine that any court
willing to summarily dismiss a plaintiff’s copyright claim on fair use
grounds would not look unfavorably on a Rule 54 Motion314 for attor-
ney’s fees.  At least one commentator has noted that the possibility of
an adverse attorney-fee award could serve as “a substantial deterrent”
to frivolous filing.315
So, in short, a defendant with a clear fair use defense—for example,
the Evergreen Eight, had they been sued—should do the following:
• File a 12(c) motion to dismiss simultaneous to her answer and
seek a hearing at the earliest possible date.  If the plaintiff did not
attach copies of the copyrighted and allegedly infringing works to
her complaint, the defendant should attach them to the motion so
the court can conduct a side-by-side comparison.316
• In the event the plaintiff seeks discovery (something she can’t do
until the parties meet and confer,317 which they don’t have to do
until twenty-one days before a Rule 16(b) scheduling confer-
ence),318 the defendant should seek a protective order from such
requests319 pending the resolution of the motion to dismiss, argu-
ing instead that no discovery is necessary.320
• If the court grants the motion to dismiss, the defendant should,
within fourteen days, move pursuant to Rule 54(d)(2)321 for an
award of attorney’s fees under § 505 of the Copyright Act.322
Assuming a defendant and the court followed that procedure—
something not unlike what occurred in Brownmark and Righthaven—
the defendant would receive all the benefits of an anti-SLAPP-like
dismissal, and perhaps copyright thugs would begin to take notice that
their bullying is far riskier than it once was.
313. Greenberg, supra note 71, at 69 n.82.
314. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2).
315. Greenberg, supra note 71, at 127.
316. See Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 690–91 (7th Cir. 2012)
(approving of the incorporation-by-reference doctrine to allow the court to consider evidence
referred, but not attached, to a plaintiff’s complaint).
317. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1).
318. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(1).
319. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
320. See Brownmark, 682 F.3d at 691 (“District courts need not, and indeed ought not, allow
discovery when it is clear that the case turns on facts already in evidence.”).
321. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2).
322. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012).
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C. Potential Criticisms
Those who would support something akin to an anti-SLAPP dismis-
sal mechanism for clear cases of copyright fair use might have some
criticisms of my suggested approach.  First, there’s no guarantee of a
discovery freeze.  Second, enterprising plaintiffs may find ways to
craft their complaint to escape summary adjudication.  Third, there’s
no guarantee of an award of attorney’s fees if the defendant prevails.
And finally, there’s no right to an interlocutory appeal if the motion is
unsuccessful.  I will address each of these arguments in turn.
1. Discovery Stay
As discussed above, preventing discovery until the motion to dis-
miss is ruled on is a key component to an anti-SLAPP law’s opera-
tion.323  Because discovery can be responsible for much of the
litigants’ expenses, making the plaintiff wait until she can show a rea-
sonable probability of success on the merits has the effect of discour-
aging nuisance suits brought solely to harass another party.324
But most anti-SLAPP statutes don’t absolutely prohibit discov-
ery.325  In fact, they provide plaintiffs with the ability to request it,
albeit in a limited form, for the purpose of defeating the motion to
dismiss.326  So even in an anti-SLAPP context, defendants aren’t guar-
anteed a discovery-free period.327
And if a defendant follows the procedure I suggest in Part VI.B—
that is, filing a Rule 12(c) motion simultaneously with her answer—
she should be able to obtain a hearing on the motion before she is
forced to “meet and confer” under Rule 26(f).328  Because neither
party can request discovery of the other side before that point, the
Federal Rules actually provide a built-in discovery stay that provides a
window for prediscovery dismissal.329
It’s also possible that a court may require some evidence—for ex-
ample, on market harm—before it can rule on a fair use defense.330
But again, that same possibility exists in the anti-SLAPP context.331
Defendants are always free to move for a protective order under Rule
323. See supra Part IV.
324. See Tate, supra note 167, at 841–42.
325. See id.
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d), (f).
329. See id.
330. See Brown, supra note 102, at 83.
331. See Tate, supra note 167, at 841–42.
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26(c),332 which courts should use to narrow the scope of discovery to
only those areas needed for the dismissal motion’s resolution.
2. Creative Pleading
I suppose it’s possible that some plaintiffs, as an anticipatory coun-
termeasure, could attempt to plead their complaint in such a way as to
avoid summary disposition or, at the very least, cause the court to
grant a request to conduct discovery.333
But this concern would be unrealistic for at least two reasons.  First,
given the heightened pleading standards announced by the Supreme
Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal334 and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,335
plaintiffs would risk a different kind of dismissal by trying to be more
vague or “hide” from the court the specific nature of their allega-
tions.336  And second, simply alleging something like market harm, for
example, in an attempt to entitle oneself to discovery on that specific
topic, is still not likely to support a request for discovery when the law
is clear that parody and other types of transformative uses don’t ad-
versely affect the market for the original work.337
3. Attorney’s Fees
Admittedly, anti-SLAPP statutes contain a significant disincentive
to plaintiffs in the form of a mandatory attorney-fee award in defend-
ants’ favor.338  But it wouldn’t be accurate to say that the disincentive
is entirely absent in the copyright context; indeed, the statute clearly
provides for the possibility that a plaintiff, should she not prevail, will
have to pay the defendants’ attorney’s fees.339  With a built-in fee-
shifting mechanism already in place, courts need to use their discre-
tion to curb “shakedown” copyright lawsuits by overaggressive
bullies.340
4. Interlocutory Appeal
This is the one true area where the victim of copyright bullying—
unlike the victim of a SLAPP suit—is disadvantaged by the lack of
statutory protection.  In the anti-SLAPP arena, a defendant who loses
332. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
333. See Brown, supra note 102, at 86.
334. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
335. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
336. Brown, supra note 102, at 86.
337. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1993).
338. See Tate, supra note 167, at 807.
339. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012).
340. See Greenberg, supra note 71, at 127.
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a motion to dismiss can appeal, thereby delaying discovery until her
appellate avenues become dead ends.341  A copyright defendant has
no similar luxury.  Although the denial of a motion to dismiss may be
premised on the fact that more discovery is needed—in which case the
defendant could presumably renew the motion once sufficient discov-
ery is obtained—it is also possible that a denial could mean the fair
use defense is not as clear as the defendant believes.  In any event, the
lack of the particular ability to interlocutorily appeal the denial means
that the defendant must engage in costly discovery and proceed to
trial before she achieves a victory.342  If there is one upside, however,
it is that the Copyright Act allows for the award of attorney’s fees in
the defendant’s favor if she ultimately prevails.343  That possibility sets
copyright claims apart from most standard state law tort claims, which
typically don’t provide for any award of attorney’s fees in a prevailing
party’s favor.344  Thus, one could argue that while an interlocutory ap-
peal is truly necessary in the SLAPP context, the Copyright Act’s fee-
shifting provision makes the appeal less important to bullying victims.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the 1980s and 1990s, companies like Apple and Microsoft intro-
duced the world to products that, by the early 2000s, enabled each of
us to be artistic creators in ways that were unimaginable mere decades
ago.345  The Internet revolution of the early aughts has allowed us to
be instantaneous global self-distributors of that work.346  Although
copyright thugs—those who use litigation or the threat of it to snuff
out what is clearly fair use—are not a new problem, their ranks are
ever increasing in today’s world of music mashups, YouTube cover
videos, and viral Facebook memes that build on and transform ex-
isting works.347
Creators must feel free to make fair use of others’ work.348  But the
fair use doctrine has arguably become little more than “the right to
hire a lawyer” to defend your actions in court.349 That defense can
341. See Tate, supra note 167, at 848.
342. See Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 2012).
343. 17 U.S.C. § 505.
344. See Case Analysis: Recovering Defendants’ Attorney’s Fees in Copyright-Infringement
Cases, BILLBOARDBIZ (Sept. 6, 2004, 12:00 AM), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/
1429304/Case-Analysis-Recovering-Defendants-Attorneys-Fees-in-Copyright.
345. See generally LESSIG, supra note 1.
346. See generally id.
347. See generally supra Part II.
348. See generally LESSIG, supra note 1.
349. Id. at 187.
2015] CLONES, THUGS, ‘N HARMONY 865
costs hundreds of thousands of dollars, so standing up to copyright
bullies is not cheap.350
State legislatures have observed a similar phenomenon associated
with defamation and tortious interference actions—citizens speaking
out on public issues were being silenced by the threat of litigation.351
As a result, they fashioned statutory disincentives, popularly known as
anti-SLAPP laws, to curb the bullying.352  These laws allow defend-
ants to avoid costly discovery by moving for early dismissal and shift-
ing the burden to the plaintiff to show she has a reasonable
probability of prevailing at trial.353
Litigants and judges can use existing rules of civil procedure, along
with the fee-shifting provision in the Copyright Act, to simulate an
anti-SLAPP effect in federal copyright actions.354  Because many fair
use cases require nothing more than a side-by-side comparison of the
two works, no costly discovery is necessary.355  If these procedures are
followed by copyright defendants and courts, we may begin to see a
decrease in bullying, and creators will begin to feel free to make fair
use of existing media.
350. See id. at 200.
351. See supra Part V.
352. See supra Part V.
353. See supra Part V.
354. See supra Part VI.
355. See supra Part VI.
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